考研英語(yǔ)必讀美文： 氣候變化高舉環(huán)保大旗

　　摘要：據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì)，考研英語(yǔ)的半數(shù)文章都來(lái)源于Times、紐約時(shí)報(bào)、科學(xué)雜志、自然雜志等時(shí)代外刊雜志。因此想要提高英語(yǔ)水平，閱讀外刊必是首選，它能夠填補(bǔ)日常復(fù)習(xí)中所缺乏的一些專(zhuān)業(yè)詞匯以及背景知識(shí)，讓你在英語(yǔ)考場(chǎng)上更加得心應(yīng)手。

　　?China is using climate policy to push through domestic reforms.中國(guó)以環(huán)境政策推動(dòng)國(guó)內(nèi)改革

　　●WHEN world leaders gathered in Paris to discuss cutting planet-heating emissions, a pall of smog hung over Beijing. In parts of the capital levels of fine particulate matter reached 30 times the limit deemed safe. Though air pollution and climate change are different things, Chinese citydwellers think of them in the same, poisoned breath. The murky skies seemed irreconcilable with the bright intentions promised in France.

　　當(dāng)各國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人齊聚巴黎討論有關(guān)減少溫室氣體排放的問(wèn)題，北京被厚厚的霧霾籠罩。在首都的某些地方，大氣細(xì)顆粒物的含量達(dá)到了最低安全指標(biāo)的30倍。盡管空氣污染和氣候變化不是一件事，但生活在城市的中國(guó)居民認(rèn)為他們都會(huì)在我們呼吸的過(guò)程中毒害我們的健康?；颐擅傻奶炜账坪鹾皖I(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在法國(guó)所承諾的美好意愿不太相符。

　　●Yet a marked change has taken place in China’s official thinking. Where once China viewed international climate talks as a conspiracy to constrain its economy, it now sees a global agreement as helpful to its own development.

　　然而中國(guó)官員的思維模式開(kāi)始有了顯著的變化。曾經(jīng)中國(guó)認(rèn)為國(guó)際氣候談判是一場(chǎng)阻礙其發(fā)展的鴻門(mén)宴，現(xiàn)在中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人將全球氣候協(xié)議看成是有助其發(fā)展的一種推動(dòng)。

　　●China accounts for two-thirds of the world’s increase in the carbon dioxide emitted since 2000. It has come a long way in recognising the problem. When China first joined international climate talks, the environment was just a minor branch of foreign policy. The ministry for environmental protection had no policymaking powers until 2008. Only in 2012 did public pressure force cities to publish air-pollution data.

　　自2000年以來(lái)，全球三分之二二氧化碳排放量的增長(zhǎng)量都來(lái)自中國(guó)。而中國(guó)在很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間后才開(kāi)始正視這個(gè)問(wèn)題。當(dāng)中國(guó)第一次參加國(guó)際氣候談判時(shí)，環(huán)境問(wèn)題僅僅只是其外交政策的一個(gè)小分支。環(huán)境保護(hù)部在2008年以前都沒(méi)有制定政策的權(quán)利。而出于公眾輿論的壓力，各市政府在2012年才公布了空氣污染數(shù)據(jù)。

　　●Yet today China pledges to cap carbon emissions by 2030 (reversing its former position that, as a developing power, it should not be bound to an absolute reduction); and it says it will cut its carbon intensity (that is, emissions per unit of GDP) by a fifth, as well as increase by the same amount the electricity generated from sources other than fossil fuels. The latest five-year plan, a blueprint for the Communist Party’s intentions that was unveiled last month, contains clear policy prescriptions for making economic development more environmentally friendly.

　　但是中國(guó)決定在2030年前控制碳排放（該決定與中國(guó)過(guò)往的立場(chǎng)完全不同，中國(guó)之前的立場(chǎng)是作為發(fā)展中國(guó)家的中國(guó)不應(yīng)該被規(guī)定做出絕對(duì)數(shù)目的減排目標(biāo)），宣布大幅減少碳濃度（即每單位GDP的排放量）達(dá)五分之一，同時(shí)中國(guó)將增加五分之一用除化石燃料以外的清潔能源來(lái)發(fā)電的電量。在上個(gè)月最新出爐的五年計(jì)劃包含著共產(chǎn)黨對(duì)中國(guó)未來(lái)的規(guī)劃，其中明確包含促使經(jīng)濟(jì)更環(huán)保發(fā)展的政策。

　　?There’s more 更多內(nèi)容

　　●Right after the Paris summit, however it ends, China is expected to make more promises in a new document, co-written by international experts, that presents a far-reaching programme of how China should clean up its act. It is based on models that account for both economic and political viability. On top of existing plans, such as launching a national emissions-trading scheme in 2017, the government may even outline proposals for a carbon tax, something that has eluded many prosperous countries in the West.

　　不管過(guò)程如何，各國(guó)在巴黎峰會(huì)上通過(guò)了一份由各國(guó)專(zhuān)家共同撰寫(xiě)的文件，其中要求中國(guó)在環(huán)境問(wèn)題上給出更多的承諾，同時(shí)該文件中還有一個(gè)計(jì)劃長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)的項(xiàng)目用以指導(dǎo)中國(guó)該如何規(guī)范其行為。該文件是基于那些給出經(jīng)濟(jì)可行性和政治可行性的模型。在現(xiàn)存計(jì)劃之外，如2017年開(kāi)始運(yùn)行的全國(guó)碳排放交易系統(tǒng)，中國(guó)政府甚至開(kāi)始擬定征收碳排放稅，而在許多發(fā)達(dá)的西方國(guó)家，這都是一件避而不談的事。

　　●The big question is why China is now so serious about climate change. The answer is not that Communist leaders are newly converted econuts. Rather, they want to use environmental concerns to rally domestic support for difficult reforms that would sustain growth in the coming decades. Since a global slowdown in 2008 it has become clear that to continue growing, China must move its economy away from construction and energy-intensive industry towards services. At the same time, China faces an energy crunch. For instance, in recent years China has been a net importer of coal, which generates two-thirds of China’s electricity. It all argues for growth plans that involve less carbon.

　　問(wèn)題是中國(guó)為什么現(xiàn)在對(duì)氣候變化如此重視？答案不是因?yàn)楣伯a(chǎn)黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人向環(huán)境保護(hù)論低頭。相反，中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人希望用環(huán)境問(wèn)題來(lái)召集國(guó)內(nèi)支持，增援改革瓶頸，維持接下來(lái)幾十年的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。自2008年全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)放緩以來(lái)，中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人開(kāi)始明白，要實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)的持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)需要擺脫建筑業(yè)密集型和能源密集型的特點(diǎn)，轉(zhuǎn)向服務(wù)集中型經(jīng)濟(jì)。與此同時(shí)，中國(guó)面臨能源枯竭問(wèn)題。舉個(gè)例子，近幾年中國(guó)是煤炭?jī)暨M(jìn)口國(guó)，而煤炭發(fā)電量占中國(guó)總發(fā)電量的三分之二。這些都讓低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)計(jì)劃成為討論熱點(diǎn)。

　　●This is where signing international accords, such as the one hoped for in Paris, come in, for they will help the government fight entrenched interests at home. Observers see a parallel with China’s joining the World Trade Organisation in 2001. It allowed leaders to push through internal economic reform against fierce domestic opposition. In the same way, a global climate treaty should help it take tough measures for restructuring the economy.

　　正如巴黎氣候大會(huì)所預(yù)設(shè)達(dá)成的協(xié)議一樣，簽署這些國(guó)際協(xié)議能夠讓各國(guó)政府更有利地對(duì)抗國(guó)內(nèi)根深蒂固的利益集團(tuán)。有分析人士認(rèn)為中國(guó)2001年加入世貿(mào)組織的行為也同樣有著這一目的。此舉讓中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人能夠在強(qiáng)烈的國(guó)內(nèi)反對(duì)聲音中繼續(xù)推動(dòng)內(nèi)部經(jīng)濟(jì)改革。同樣，全球性的氣候條約能夠使得一些重構(gòu)經(jīng)濟(jì)的硬措施成為可能。

　　●It will not be easy. Provincial party bosses and state-owned enterprises hate to shut factories, particularly in those parts of the country, such as Shanxi and Inner Mongolia in the north, where coal is a big employer. Cutting demand for energy is even harder. Even if the amount of electricity used by state industry falls, that used by private firms and households is bound to increase. What is more, environmental regulations and laws laid down by the centre are routinely flouted.

　　但是這不會(huì)是件簡(jiǎn)單的事。各省級(jí)政府以及各個(gè)國(guó)企領(lǐng)導(dǎo)不希望關(guān)閉工廠，特別是像山西和內(nèi)蒙古這些以煤礦業(yè)提供工作崗位的北方省份。降低能源需求就更苦難了。即使國(guó)有產(chǎn)業(yè)的用電量下降了，民用和私營(yíng)企業(yè)的用電量一定都會(huì)上升。另外，由中央政府制定有關(guān)環(huán)境的法律法規(guī)常常遭到各地政府的無(wú)視。

　　●But cleaning up China’s act has, for the central government, become a political necessity too. Environmental issues have been major public concerns for over a decade, says Anthony Saich of Harvard University, which has conducted polls. True, rural people fret most (and with good reason) about water pollution. But those in the cities gripe about their toxic air. Both represent a reproach to the government over its neglect of people’s lives and health.

　　但對(duì)于中央政府來(lái)說(shuō)，變更中國(guó)的行為模式也開(kāi)始有了政治必要性。哈佛大學(xué)的安東尼·塞挈進(jìn)行了一項(xiàng)投票調(diào)查，稱(chēng)環(huán)境問(wèn)題在過(guò)去十年中變成了公眾關(guān)心的一大問(wèn)題。事情確實(shí)是這樣的，比如農(nóng)村居民最擔(dān)心的是水污染問(wèn)題（這個(gè)擔(dān)心也是非常合理的）。但那些居住在城市的人抱怨空氣中的毒害成分。這兩種人都表達(dá)了對(duì)政府忽略人民生命健康的斥責(zé)。

　　●That is why national economic goals, political goals, public opinion and international pressure all point towards trying to cut emissions, pollutants included. In particular, says Zhang Zhongxiang of Tianjin University, now that dealing with climate change is a pillar of China’s diplomacy, the government must show it can keep its promises. It has some tools at its disposal. Across the country, the environmental record of government officials has become a crucial part of their evaluation by the Communist Party; and cadres will be held accountable for their actions even after leaving their position. Several provinces have already punished officials for environmental accidents and for not enforcing environmental laws.

　　這也是為什么國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)目標(biāo)、政治期望、民眾意見(jiàn)以及國(guó)際壓力都將矛頭指向了減少某些污染物在內(nèi)的排放量。就像天津大學(xué)的張忠祥所說(shuō)的一樣，現(xiàn)在氣候變化問(wèn)題成為中國(guó)外交的重點(diǎn)之一，政府必須要拿出遵守承諾的行動(dòng)。中國(guó)有著其自身可用的方法處理環(huán)境問(wèn)題。環(huán)境行政檔案成為了共產(chǎn)黨評(píng)定一個(gè)政府官員的重要依據(jù)，各級(jí)政府官員即使在離職后依然要對(duì)其在職時(shí)所作的決策負(fù)責(zé)。某些省份已經(jīng)因?yàn)槌霈F(xiàn)有關(guān)環(huán)境問(wèn)題的事故或者沒(méi)有依環(huán)境法行政等問(wèn)題對(duì)一些官員進(jìn)行了懲處。

　　?Fifty shades of grey 五十度灰

　　●But there are obstacles to real change. The electricity grid and national power market are ill-equipped to increase renewable generation by much. Corruption in industrial procurement remains widespread, which does nothing to promote long-term efficiency or reductions in emissions. Competing incentives are also in play: earlier this year, the authorities forced a big Chinese investment company to buy back shares it had sold in old-fashioned industrial fields, for fear that it might depress share prices (which crashed anyway in a more general stockmarket meltdown). The government will not trust market mechanisms alone, says Yang Fuqiang of the Natural Resources Defense Council, an activist group.

　　但想要真正做到改變，前面還有一些攔路虎。國(guó)家電網(wǎng)和國(guó)家能源市場(chǎng)對(duì)于新能源大量涌入沒(méi)有足夠的準(zhǔn)備。行業(yè)采購(gòu)中的腐敗行為依然泛濫，這對(duì)于提高長(zhǎng)期效率以及減少排放沒(méi)有好處。競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激勵(lì)依然起作用：今年早些時(shí)候，一家大型中國(guó)投資公司在舊工業(yè)領(lǐng)域出售了許多股份，但有關(guān)部門(mén)因?yàn)閾?dān)心拋售會(huì)使股份價(jià)格貶值（雖然其股價(jià)在股市暴跌情況下依然跌至低谷），于是強(qiáng)制要求其購(gòu)回相應(yīng)股份。維權(quán)團(tuán)體自然資源保護(hù)委員會(huì)的楊富強(qiáng)稱(chēng)，政府不會(huì)把寶都?jí)涸谑袌?chǎng)機(jī)制上的。

　　●Nor are leaders yet pushing for change on all fronts. For instance, government efforts to cut emissions of carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide are greater than for many other greenhouse gases. Scarce and polluted water, one of China’s most severe environmental challenges, is almost entirely beyond the scope of the current raft of reforms. And China refuses to publish its estimate of the environmental toll of economic growth.

　　但政府也沒(méi)有在每個(gè)方面都推進(jìn)改革。例如政府對(duì)于減少二氧化碳和氮氧化物所采取行動(dòng)明顯大于其他溫室氣體。稀缺且日益受到污染的水資源是中國(guó)最嚴(yán)重的環(huán)境威脅之一，但卻幾乎沒(méi)有沒(méi)能在這一輪改革的方案之中看到相關(guān)措施。而且中國(guó)政府拒絕透露經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)所帶來(lái)的環(huán)境破壞預(yù)估值。

　　●Sceptics scoff that China’s promises in Paris are irrelevant because emissions will probably peak regardless, long before the promised 2030. Nor has the government said how high that top might be. Yet the sceptics underestimate the importance of an international agreement for China and beyond. Like other countries, China has to date followed a pattern of “grow first, clean up later”. Yet very quickly it has recognised the dangers and drawbacks of such a policy and has been pouring money into clean energy and other innovations it hopes will provide green growth. In that, it may prove a model for other fast-developing countries. That might signal a small patch of blue sky.

　　持懷疑態(tài)度的人嘲弄稱(chēng)中國(guó)在巴黎氣候大會(huì)上的承諾根本毫無(wú)意義，因?yàn)檫h(yuǎn)在2030年前，全球溫室氣體排放量不論如何都會(huì)達(dá)到最大。盡管沒(méi)有政府預(yù)計(jì)過(guò)這個(gè)最大的具體數(shù)值是多少，但這些人都低估了國(guó)際協(xié)議對(duì)于現(xiàn)在和以后的中國(guó)的重要性。和其他國(guó)家一樣，中國(guó)曾經(jīng)采用“先污染后治理”的模式。但是很快中國(guó)政府就意識(shí)到了其中的危害和缺點(diǎn)，并投入大量資金建設(shè)清潔能源和其他有助于綠色增長(zhǎng)模式的研發(fā)。因此，中國(guó)或許能夠成為其他高速發(fā)展國(guó)家的可模仿的例子。這可能標(biāo)志著天空那一抹蔚藍(lán)色出現(xiàn)。